



Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

Monthly IED Activity Report



DOI: 28 February 2018

About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center resources USARAPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.



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
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
Executive Summary: In February, there were 114 IED events across the Asia-Pacific region, consisting of 63 detonation, 18 found/cleared, two hoax, and 31 cache events. Compared to last month, IED activity increased by 36%, while IED-related casualties decreased by 2%. There was elevated IED activity in both South and Southeast Asia. In Northeast Asia, there were no reported events.

There were 114 IED events in the Asia-Pacific region in February 2018




Icons depict events for February 2018; heat map depicts event density from February 2017 - February 2018


February IED events



February IED events by Country




February IED Casualties



[Click on an entry to advance to the associated page.](#)

This document is limited to those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.

February Asia-Pacific IED Events by Region



Executive Summary (Continued)

SOUTH ASIA


In South Asia, IED activity increased from 63 events in January to 76 events in February. IED-related casualty rates also increased, up 20% from January. In Bangladesh, there were six IED events (a slight drop from the previous month) and one IED-related casualty (**see pg. 9**). In India, elevated IED rates continued for a second straight month and IED-related casualties rose from 23 to 26 casualties (**see pg. 10**). In Nepal, there was a sharp increase in IED events, although IED-related casualty rates remained relatively low (**see pg. 11**).

SOUTHEAST ASIA


In Southeast Asia, IED activity increased from 21 events in January to 38 events in February. Despite this increase, IED-related casualty rates decreased from 63 to 56 casualties. In Thailand, IED activity was slightly above average, however, IED-related casualty rates were roughly three-times lower than January's figures (**see pg. 14**). In the Philippines, IED activity marginally increased from last month, while IED-related casualties marginally decreased (**see pg. 13**). In Burma, IED activity remained low, although, there were two significant IED incidents; a 23 FEB mass-casualty attack in Shan State and a 24 FEB coordinated attack in Rakhine State's capital, Sittwe (**see pg. 15**).

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.

PACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months



Icons depict events from February 2017 to February 2018; occasional overlap occurs




South Asia witnesses the highest level of IED events in the region, primarily due to India's high activity. IED activity across the region is often centered around periods of political unrest or contested elections. Devices thrown or emplaced during those outbreaks of violence vary widely in complexity (e.g. basic, command-wire to radio-controlled) and lethality.


Southeast Asia sees approximately half the activity of South Asia, with the Philippines and Thailand as the primary contributors to the number of events. While Thailand's IED activity is primarily attributable to Muslim-Malay insurgents in the south, the Philippines faces communist, jihadist, and Moro separatist threats. By comparison, attacks in Indonesia and Malaysia are far less frequent.

Northeast Asia sees relatively few IED attacks and they can often be attributed to an individual's act of protest against an employer, the government, or retaliation against an acquaintance. Disaffected groups, such as the Uyghurs in China, occasionally incorporate IEDs in their attacks. Press reporting from the region is limited and generally unreliable, therefore actual events are likely higher than shown here.

Past Year IED events




Past Year IED events by Country




IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type



Group Affiliation



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

Incident Highlight: JMB in West Bengal, India

On 19 JAN, Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) militants attempted to attack the Bodh Gaya Buddhist temple complex in Gaya, Bihar, India. The militants emplaced three IEDs while the Dalai Lama was visiting the site; only one of the devices detonated. The intended target may have been the Dalai Lama himself and/or the throngs of tourists and pilgrims that came to the site to hear him speak. Although the JMB has historically used West Bengal as a safe haven to launch operations into Bangladesh, this is the first known attack by the group in India. Investigation of the incident led to several follow-on raids and has unveiled an emerging threat against India.

The devices reportedly weighed 10kg apiece, though some reports specified 7kg of ammonium nitrate as a main charge. The attackers used "thermoses" as containers, with batteries and wires on the outside. Though the devices were large, India's National Security Guard (NSG) claimed poor construction led to a low-intensity detonation.



Indian security forces assessing damage from the Bodh Gaya attack

Soon after the initial detonation, investigators discovered there was a flurry of calls to the known JMB safehaven in Murshidabad, West Bengal. A 31 JAN raid in the area led to the capture of two JMB members in Murshidabad and Darjeeling. Investigators recovered 50kg of ammonium nitrate, IED construction materials, and incriminating documents at the detainees' homes. During interrogations, the detainees confessed to carrying out the attack, claiming the plot was to avenge the treatment of Rohingya by the Burmese government. The detainees also indicated the attack was intended to be much larger in scale, with an additional five devices, but the premature detonation led them to abort. They also revealed the location of another cache with 200kg of ammonium nitrate and IED construction materials (which was later recovered), and the existence of a broader JMB plan to target India.

The Bodh Gaya attack appears to have been part of a larger JMB plan to attack India. Interrogations of the JMB detainees indicated they were recruited by senior JMB leader Salauddin Ahmed (alias Salauddin Salehin), who has allegedly stood up at least seven Neo-JMB cells in West Bengal, with 10-12 members each, all formed within the last nine months. Salauddin is calling this splinter group Jama'atul Mujahideen India (JMI) and in an interview with Sahm Al Hind (their media wing), he claims the group is "working to ensure that Hindustan, too, turns into a centre for Hijrat (migration for religious battle) and Jihad." Interestingly, though Neo-JMB is reported to be affiliated with ISIS, Salauddin is known to have criticized IS and has made clear that he is following AQ, indicating a possible al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) linkage.

Given the size of the assessed JMB support network in West Bengal and the occurrence of a high-profile, though botched attack, this target shift is likely to have significant ramifications for India's security outlook. However, India is taking steps to disrupt and dismantle the network.

Sources: Indian Express (1/22/18) Hindustan Times (1/20/18) Times of India (2/2/18) Times of India (2/3/18) Times of India (2/3/18) Hindustan Times (2/10/18)

Special Assessment: North Korea's Irregular Warfare Options

Over the past several years, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has held the world's attention as they inched closer towards improving their nuclear weapon designs and missile technology. While diplomatic efforts to peacefully denuclearize DPRK continue, much of the related press attention has focused on the conventional weaponry and tactics available to the DPRK's Korean People's Army (KPA), should conflict breakout. Less well publicized are the DPRK's irregular warfare options, which include the use of advanced IEDs and chemical warfare agents to conduct acts of terrorism and political assassinations, and the employment of cyber operations for the purposes of espionage and to target critical infrastructure.

The DPRK's most recent suspected use of chemical weapons occurred in February 2017, when Kim Jong-nam, half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, was killed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia after being attacked with VX nerve agent by two women in the airport (**see February 2017 Incident Highlight**). VX, a fast-acting compound banned in the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, is just one of many known chemical warfare compounds produced by the DPRK; others include mustard gas, sarin, and hydrogen cyanide. In 2012, South Korea's Ministry of National Defense (MND) estimated that the DPRK possesses between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of chemical weapons. Despite international condemnation, the DPRK continues to operate a robust chemical weapons program, particularly as the international community has interdicted several, illegal shipments of chemical weapons destined to the Syrian government. While the bulk of the DPRK's chemical weapons are expected to be delivered via conventional weapons systems, the February 2017 assassination case demonstrates that they are also capable of precisely deploying the weapon against a specific human target who is moving through a crowded public space.

Regarding IEDs, the DPRK is known to possess both the capability and intent to use such devices, as evidenced by their employment of IEDs in the 1980s. On 9 OCT 1983, 19 people were killed, including six South Korean government personnel, when DPRK operatives detonated IEDs during a wreath-laying ceremony at the Martyrs' Mausoleum in Rangoon, Burma. The intent of the attack was to kill the South Korean Prime Minister, though he was not injured because he was stuck in traffic on his way to the ceremony. DPRK operatives emplaced the IEDs in the ceiling of the main hall and the detonation caused significant damage to the site; however, the IEDs detonated early when the bugle song (the cue for initiation) for the Prime Minister's arrival inadvertently started to play. The next significant IED attack committed by DPRK operatives occurred on 29 NOV 1987, when Korean Airlines flight 858 from Baghdad to Seoul was destroyed, killing 115 civilians. Two DPRK agents posing as Japanese tourists, who deplaned when the flight stopped in Abu Dhabi, emplaced the timed IED in an overhead bin. The motivation for the attack may have been an attempt to discredit South Korean security ahead of the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics.

Evidence of IED training comes from statements made by a former DPRK spy who was shot and captured in South Korea in 1995. He described going through four years of technical training, which included learning skills in rigging explosives, at a specialized university to become a spy for the North. These historical examples highlight not only persistent intention by the ruling Kim family to use irregular tactics to advance political agendas and for retaliatory attacks, but also highlight the ingenuity to emplace explosives without sacrificing skilled operatives in the process. It can be assumed that IED construction and emplacement capability has only improved, as information on construction methodologies is now widely available online.



Aftermath of the DPRK's 1983 IED attack in Rangoon, killing 21 people, including four South Korean Cabinet ministers

The DPRK has used foreign conflicts to hone its irregular warfare capabilities. Training and maintaining the combat capabilities of DPRK forces has led to the deployment of DPRK military advisors and military personnel to foreign conflict zones since 1953. Sub-Saharan Africa has been one of the major locations for DPRK deployments, with particular emphasis on shoring up state forces to restore political stability and to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Most recently, reports released since 2013 indicate that DPRK forces have been deploying to Syria in support of the Assad government; however, the Assad government and DPRK spokespeople have contested the validity of these reports. Despite their denials, the provision of support by the DPRK to Syria is quite likely as the two nations have a historically recognized relationship that includes the exchange of material assistance, military expertise, and technical knowledge to support the advancement of their respective war-fighting capabilities.

Special Assessment: North Korea's Irregular Warfare Options

Media noted as early as 2009 that the DPRK was likely studying the use of irregular warfare TTPs, to include IEDs, from incidents occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan (and later Syria). It was similarly noted that DPRK SOF are likely training to use IEDs to slow any movement of US and South Korean troops north, or as a component of their "Second Front" doctrine, which necessitates the activation of infiltrators in South Korea to emplace IEDs in logistically significant areas (e.g. major road networks, sea ports, and airports) to hinder the flow of supplies and personnel. In support of infiltration operations into the south, the DPRK dug several tunnels across the DMZ in the 1970s, one of which came within 30 miles of Seoul. Another means of infiltration was the funneling of agents through an organization in Japan into South Korea following training in the DPRK. While many of these operatives and agents were ultimately captured or killed in South Korea, it is possible that some remained with the intent of forwarding the goals of the DPRK regime through irregular means.

One of the most concerning irregular warfare options available to the DPRK involves their rapidly growing cyber warfare capabilities. Over the past few years, DPRK has performed cyber-attacks upon its adversaries with increasing scale and capacity. These attacks, which cyber experts have attributed to the DPRK's Lazarus Group, include the 2014 hacking of Sony Pictures, the 2016 theft of USD 81 million from the Bangladesh Central Bank, and the spread of the WannaCry ransomware, which reached computers in 150 countries in 2017. In 2018, US cyber security experts identified a new DPRK cyber warfare group known as Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 37 or Reaper, which has demonstrated the ability to exploit zero-day vulnerabilities in their operations and to develop custom malware. This trend of increasing sophistication is alarming given that advanced cyber warfare capabilities could increase the DPRK's asymmetric advantage and provide an alternative means of responding to provocations.



Students at the Mangyongdae Revolution School, an elite military training school in Pyongyang


While there are significant knowledge gaps concerning the current state of the DPRK's irregular warfare capabilities, awareness of how these capabilities have been deployed historically provides security forces and analysts with some degree of understanding. Based on the DPRK's demonstrated use and study of IED TTPs, military planners have to assume IED capabilities are on par or possibly even more sophisticated than what has been previously observed in conflict zones such as Syria and Iraq (e.g. RCIEDs with radio frequency counter-countermeasures). Moreover, the DPRK's successful deployment of hand-delivered VX in public spaces is likely to embolden similar TTPs during wartime, which can deliver the regime a psychological victory. Finally, the DPRK's growing cyber capabilities are a force multiplier and will likely become the DPRK's most effective means to attack the US homeland in the event of hostilities.

Sources: Army War College (2007) NYT (10/29/09) 38 North (10/10/13) CNN (5/21/15) WIB (5/24/16) Global Firepower (2017) National Interest (3/13/17) Global Security (April 2017) Reuters (4/21/17) Reuters (8/21/17) BBC News (10/2/17) NYT (11/4/17) 38 North (1/3/18) CFR (1/3/18) Rand (1/17/18) US-Korea Institute (March 2017) Business insider (1/29/18) Arms Control (January 2018) Reuters (2/2/18) Diplomat (2/27/18) NYT (2/27/18) Scientific American (2/20/18) Reuters (3/20/18)

Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

POI: Salauddin Salehin

ALIAS: Salahuddin; Salauddin Ahmed; Hafizur Rahman Sheikh; Mahin; Sajeeb; Sunny **DOB:** 25 JAN 1980
POB: Madhabpasha, Narayanganj, Bangladesh **AREA OF OPERATIONS:** India; Bangladesh
AFFILIATIONS: Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB); Jama'atul Mujahideen India (JMI); al-Qa'ida



Salauddin Salehin is an active member of JMB since the group's establishment in 2001 and operates in both Bangladesh and India, but recently, he has invested a considerable portion of his efforts to JMB activities in India. Recent reporting indicates that Salehin is the Emir of JMB, as well as the founder and current leader of the newly established JMI (an Indian-based faction of JMB). Reports indicate that Salehin is a strong motivational speaker and an expert recruiter. He has been in and out of prison in Bangladesh and was sentenced to death in 2003 for murdering a Christian convert. Salehin escaped from prison in 2014 and allegedly fled to India, where he met with JMB associates in West Bengal. From West Bengal, Salehin began establishing bases in Bengal, Assam and Jharkhand, India.

In a 2017 interview, Salehin stated he follows AQ (JMB's original "role model") and criticized ISIS-aligned Neo-JMB. Despite Salehin's proclaimed adherence to AQ, there is no evidence of a direct linkage or ideological alignment of JMB with al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). In the same interview, Salehin stated that JMB is pursuing training and armed combat to advance their plan of establishing a caliphate in Hindustan (India).

The JMB's first reported attack in India occurred in January 2018, which targeted a teashop near the Kaichakra Maidan (of the Bodh Gaya temple complex) in Gaya, Bihar, India. The attack was unsuccessful as only one of three IEDs detonated (resulting in no casualties) and security forces apprehended several of the perpetrators. The captured militants claimed association with JMB and stated they carried out the attack to, "exact revenge for the continued genocide and torture of Rohingya in Burma."

Salehin's comments in conjunction with JMB's recent actions may be an opportunistic ploy to energize support around him and his group and to capitalize on the widespread sentiment of the persecuted Rohingya. In the future, he may take advantage of, and align with, existing regional conflicts to provide support to other likeminded organizations. This could include the following groups: the Jammu/Kashmir-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) or the Aqa Mul Mujahideen (AMM) (a possible Islamist organization in Rohingya territory but operates independently of ARSA).

Sources: DhakaTribune (08/03/2017) TRAC (02/04/2018) NIA (02/15/2018) HindustanTimes (02/10/2018) The Hindu (12/01/2014) DhakaTribune (08/17/2016) bdnews24 (02/24/2014) The Daily Star (02/23/2014) RFA (02/02/2018) The Times of India (02/03/2018)

VEO: Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)

AREA OF OPERATIONS: southern Thailand, northern Malaysia **LEADER:** Rorhing Ahsong (alias Ustaz Rorhing) **ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS:** BRN-C

The RKK is an ethnic separatist militant group that operates primarily in the three southern provinces of Thailand with the aim of establishing a separate Islamic government in southern Thailand and northern Malaysia. Members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C), who had spent time training in Indonesia, formed the RKK in 2002. It is still closely connected to the BRN-C, and some experts still consider the RKK to be a subordinate combat unit of the BRN-C. The RKK has an estimated 500 to 3,000 members, and is suspected of committing approximately 130 IED attacks resulting in 330 casualties between 2008-2016.



The RKK's overarching strategy is to undermine the local populace's faith that Thai security forces can protect them. In pursuit of this objective, RKK militants engage in a constant stream of violence in an attempt to wear down Thai security forces, draining both morale and resources. Primary targets include infrastructure (such as powerlines), security forces (including teacher escorts), businesses, and other public locations. The RKK is organized into small cells of five to eight members and use IEDs (including RCIEDs), small arms, and bladed weapons to carry out their attacks. One feature of RKK IED attacks is the use of first responder targeting: RKK militants will detonate one IED to lure first responders into a secondary IED detonation.

The RKK's most recent large-scale attack occurred on 21 JAN, during which they detonated a motorcycle VBIED at a marketplace, killing three civilians and wounding 30 others. Thai authorities arrested two RKK militants after the attack, one of whom is a skilled IED maker. The attack shows the willingness of the RKK to attack both Muslim and Buddhist civilians in addition to security forces.

It is likely the RKK will continue to conduct attacks despite Thai authorities making multiple arrests over the last several years. Reasons for their continued success include the de-centralized command organization and a support base in rural villages.

Sources: Jamestown (9/8/06) The Terrorist Threat from Thailand (2012) START GTD (2016) Handbook of Terrorism in the Pacific (2016) al Jazeera (1/21/18) Thai PBS (1/24/18)

South Asia: February Significant Activity

Bangladesh

On 12 FEB, an alleged member of neo-Jamaat Mujahideen Bangladesh (neo-JMB), Asmaul Husna (alias Sumona) stabbed a Dhaka police assistant commissioner. The Dhaka police arrived at Asamul's residence to ask her questions about her sister, Momena Shoma, who is accused of stabbing a nurse in Australia on 10 FEB, when Asamul launched her attack. **Brisbane Times (2/14/18)**

On 13 FEB the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) arrested three suspected members of the neo-JMB from Dhaka's Tejgaon area. The RAB also seized arms, extremist literature, and foreign currencies. **Daily Star (2/13/18)**

India

On 4 FEB, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) arrested Mahfooz Alam, a suspected Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) operative from Khajurnanni, Gopalganj for his alleged involvement in providing logistic and financial support to a LeT sleeper cell. The arrest of Mahfooz follows the interrogation of two suspected operatives of JMB, identified as Sheikh Paigamber and Sheikh Jairul, who were recently arrested by the Kolkata police's special task force. **AniNews (3/4/18) Telegraph (2/5/18)**

Authorities announced in February that a road will be built along the border between Chhattisgarh's Sukma and Dantewada districts in the jungle area of Kondasawli. The road, which will benefit 24 villages and approximately 15,000 people, will be key terrain in the fight against Naxalite extremists. Indian road construction projects throughout Chhattisgarh have eased the movement and sustainment of troops. The Chhattisgarh police, District Reserve Guard (DRG), and Special Task Force (STF) are monitoring and providing security for this road construction. **Business Standard (2/12/18)**

On 12 FEB, NIA investigators arrested a suspected ISIS supporter, Ansar Meeran, in Chennai, Tamil Nadu as part of their probe into a plot focused on the execution of terror attacks in the state. NIA officers had been searching for Meeran for the past year, as he was the fourth most wanted person related to the attack plans. The NIA captured Meeran at a hideout near Poonamallee. **The Times of India (2/13/18)**

On 14 FEB, media reported that authorities arrested Ariz Khan, a suspected Indian Mujahideen (IM) militant. According to police, Khan played a key role in the 2008 IED attacks in Ahmedabad, Jaipur and Delhi that claimed 165 lives. He is suspected to be the bomb-maker responsible for building the 43 IEDs used in the attacks. **NDTV (2/14/18)**


On 20 FEB, the Delhi Special Police cell released evidence that IM was in the process of regrouping and reviving their activities across India. The Delhi Special Police base this conclusion on information derived from a detained IM operative, Abdul Subhan Qureshi (alias Tauqeer), who was arrested in January 2018. During interrogation he revealed that he had been in Saudi Arabia from 2015 to 2017 to coordinate with IM's co-founder, Riyaz Bhatkal. During his time in Riyadh, he allegedly met with LeT operatives and outlined plans to use Nepal as an operational headquarters. **Hindustan Times (2/21/18)**

Maldives

Starting on 1 FEB and continuing throughout the rest of the month, the Maldives experienced instability due to the move by the Supreme Court order to release political prisoners and the reinstatement of 12 opposition lawmakers. The move was seen as an attempt to remove President Yameen from power, as the reinstated lawmakers would have been able to push an impeachment order through the parliament. Initially, police stated they would uphold the order, but shortly thereafter, the police commissioner was relieved from duty. On 5 FEB, President Yameen declared a state of emergency for 15 days. Protests, which had been ongoing since 1 FEB, erupted again in the streets and anti-riot forces responded with force. A series of attacks on media infrastructure resulted in the shutdown of numerous news outlets and the main TV station in the country. Several high-ranking political figures, including two Supreme Court justices and former President Gayoom, were arrested for their alleged role in the Supreme Court decision. Lastly, freedoms in the country were further restricted, as the right to remain silent and the right to a speedy trial were suspended; additionally, the Supreme Court was declared to not be the final authority on the Constitution and law of the land. **Maldives Independent (2/12/18)**

On 6 FEB, exiled former Maldivian President Nasheed tweeted an appeal to send an Indian military-backed envoy to ensure the release of political prisoners and lawmakers in the Maldives. India's ruling party leader, Yashwant Sinha, stated that the Indian military could be mobilized to respond to the crisis in the Maldives as it can be considered a threat to national security. Cited amongst the reasons for this determination is the number of fighters leaving the Maldives to fight in Syria and Iraq, as well as reports that the Chinese military has established a presence on 17 to 18 Maldivian islands. **BBC News (2/6/18) Hindu (2/9/18) Mihaaru (2/12/18)**

Bangladesh: February IED Events



There were three IED detonation events, one IED found and cleared event, and two IED cache events.


On 18 FEB, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) executed a raid on a Rajshahi residence and discovered an IED cache containing the following items: 500 grams of gunpowder, 2 books, 40 grams of soda, 40 grams of limestone, five pages of notes, seven leaflets, and bomb-making materials. In addition to the cache find, the RAB arrested three JMB members: Sahebjan Ali, 35; Abul Kalam Azad, 28; and Jahangir Alam, 28. **The Hindu (2/18/18)**

On 23 FEB, an IED was thrown at the residence of Imam Moulana Asaduzzaman in Sarishabari, Jamalpur with no injuries or casualties. Asaduzzaman is the imam of the Ahmadiyya Mulsim Jamaat Jame Mosque. **The Daily Star (2/25/18)**


On 24 FEB, the Rapid Action Battalion's bomb disposal unit defused an IED after office workers discovered it in the Deputy Commissioner's office in Jessore. **BD News 24 (2/25/18)**

On 27 FEB, an IED detonated at a Bangladesh Chhatra League Convention held at the Engineers' Institute in Chittagong; 15 personnel were injured. Convention leaders believe that some unidentified outsiders led the attack as their guests spoke against the banned Islamist political party, Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, and their student wing, Bangladesh Islami Chhatra Shibir. **BD News 24 (2/27/18)**

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year IED Event Casualty Count




The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) continued its aggressive operations against neo-JMB safe-houses, resulting in several arrests and a cache recovery. The RAB's continued operational pressure has contributed to a reduction in IED activity to less than 10 events per month for the ninth consecutive month.

Bangladesh has experienced small-scale IED incidents at political events and the use of IEDs for criminal purposes; however, these actions have yielded only minor effects.

As the RAB and other Bangladeshi security forces continue to disrupt neo-JMB networks, IED activity will likely remain low.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

India: February IED Events



There were 29 IED detonation events, four IED found and cleared events, and 16 IED cache events.



On 4 FEB, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) arrested Mahfooz Alam, a suspected Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) operative from Khajurnanni, Gopalganj for his alleged involvement in providing logistic and financial support to a LeT sleeper cell. The arrest of Mahfooz follows the interrogation of two suspected operatives of JMB, identified as Sheikh Paigamber and Sheikh Jairul, who were recently arrested by the Kolkata police. **AniNews (3/4/18) Telegraph (2/5/18)**

Authorities announced in February that a road will be built along the border between Chhattisgarh's Sukma and Dantewada districts in the jungle area of Kondasawli. The road, which will benefit 24 villages and approximately 15,000 people, will be key terrain in the fight against Naxalite extremists. Indian road construction projects throughout Chhattisgarh have eased the movement and sustainment of troops. The Chhattisgarh police, District Reserve Guard (DRG), and Special Task Force (STF) are monitoring and providing security for this road construction. **Business Standard (2/12/18)**

On 12 FEB, NIA investigators arrested a suspected ISIS supporter, Ansar Meeran, in Chennai, Tamil Nadu as part of their probe into a plot focused on the execution of terror attacks in the state. NIA officers had been searching for Meeran for the past year, as he was the fourth most wanted person related to the attack plans. The NIA captured Meeran at a hideout near Poonamallee. **The Times of India (2/13/18)**

On 14 FEB, media reported that authorities arrested Ariz Khan, a suspected Indian Mujahideen (IM) militant. According to police, Khan played a key role in the 2008 IED attacks in Ahmedabad, Jaipur and Delhi that claimed 165 lives. He is suspected to be the bomb-maker responsible for building the 43 IEDs used in the attacks. **NDTV (2/14/18)**

On 20 FEB, the Delhi Special Police cell released evidence that IM was in the process of regrouping and reviving their activities across India. The Delhi Special Police base this conclusion on information derived from a detained IM operative, Abdul Subhan Qureshi (alias Tauqeer), who was arrested in January 2018. During interrogation he revealed that he had been in Saudi Arabia from 2015 to 2017 to coordinate with IM's co-founder, Riyaz Bhatkal. During his time in Riyadh, he allegedly met with LeT operatives and outlined plans to use Nepal as an operational headquarters. **Hindustan Times (2/21/18)**





Overall IED activity remained elevated through February compared to India's typical baseline, though activity was reduced somewhat from January. Though Jammu and Kashmir is now maintaining a steady amount of IED activity, and Maoist activity is rising, the majority of the increased activity can be attributed to a particularly violent election season in the Northeastern states. Depending on the rate of increase of activity in northern India and areas affected by Left Wing Extremism, activity will likely continue to drop in the short term, though baseline levels of activity are expected to increase in the medium-to-long-term due to renewed activity in Jammu and Kashmir.

Throughout February, India continued its attempts to dismantle the network associated with the 19 JAN Bodh Gaya attack, resulting in much more information about the group and its motivations (for more information on these events see this month's **Person of Interest and Incident Highlight**).

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Nepal: February IED Events



There were 11 IED detonation events, seven IED found and cleared events, two IED hoax events, and one IED cache event.

On 10 FEB, an IED detonated at the office of an Indian construction company in Birendranagar, Surkhet, Bheri; police detained three suspects. The office is responsible for the construction of the Upper Karnali Hydropower project. The attack is likely connected to the attacks at the Upper Karnali dam and the Arun III dam, which occurred on the same night.

Nepal Monitor (2/11/18)

On 10 FEB, an IED detonated at the dam site of the Upper Karnali Hydropower project in Dab, Dailekh, Bheri. The attack is likely connected to the attacks at the Birenranagar office and the Arun III dam powerhouse on the same night. **Nepal Monitor (2/12/18)**

On 10 FEB, an IED detonated at the dam powerhouse of the Arun III Hydropower project in Sankhuwasabha, Kosi, damaging the walls and gate. The attack is likely connected to the attacks at the Birenranagar office and the Upper Karnali dam on the same night. **Nepal Monitor (2/12/18)**

On 20 FEB, Nepal Army EOD cleared multiple IEDs emplaced by the Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M) (Netra Bikram Chand) from the Shanti Stupa in Nagdhunga, Pokhara, Kaski, Gandaki. The stupa is located near the Provincial Governor's residence. **Kathmandu Post (2/21/18)**

On 20 FEB, an IED detonated before Nepal Army EOD could defuse it in Bijayapur, Pokhara Leknath-14, Kaski, Gandaki; one police officer and one journalist were injured. Police arrested two suspected CPN-M (Netra Bikram Chand) militants the following day for their involvement in several IED attacks in the area. **Nepal Monitor**

IED activity spiked in February, with a series of attacks against infrastructure driving up the number of events. Early in the month, there were two events at hydropower projects followed by several events at cell phone towers. Later in the month, authorities attributed several events to CPN-M (Netra Bikram Chand) militants and another event was attributed to JTMM-R (their first reported event in 2018).

Following months of increased violence due to elections, it was expected that the violence would drop once the government stabilized. However, the number of events in February indicate that certain groups are still agitating, though the reasons for this remain unclear. In the coming months, it is possible that the number of events will remain high if groups continue to aggressive activities.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Southeast Asia: February Significant Activity

Philippines

On 28 FEB, the Philippine National Police (PNP) conducted the first anti-terror drill called Southern Storm in Davao City. Hundreds of personnel from police, military, local government, and other agencies took part in the drill, which simulated terrorist acts. The police have been receiving reports that the Maute Group is recruiting, but currently lacks the resources to launch another Marawi City-like siege; however, authorities are still preparing for such a contingency. This drill focused on improving coordination among the agencies, as coordination has been one of their weaker areas in anti-terror drills. **Rappler (2/28/18)**

The U.S. State Department (DoS) designated ISIS-Philippines (ISIS-PHL) and their seven affiliated subgroups as terrorist organizations. The Maute Group, one of the seven ISIS-PHL subgroups that was designated, plays an integral role in the organization and was primarily responsible for the siege in Marawi. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stated that having this group designated as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" (SDGT) will significantly assist the Philippines in its on-going anti-terrorism campaign. **PNA (2/28/18) Long War Journal (2/27/18)**

Malaysia

In late FEB, Malaysian police killed three suspected militants in a shootout in Tawau, Sabah. The three militants were attempting to escape pursuing policemen on a plantation when they had opened fire. Initially, reports surfaced that Nurhassan Jamiri, an ASG leader who is near the top of the Philippines' most wanted terrorist list, was among the three that were killed. However, more recent reports from Philippine officials indicate that Nurhassan Jamiri was not killed based upon a visual comparison of the deceased to known images of Jamiri. Although Malaysian police have not yet identified the trio, they believe they were linked to a terrorist network due to the weapons they owned and tactics they demonstrated during the shootout. Police have submitted fingerprints and photographs of the trio to Interpol and neighboring countries to identify the individuals. **The Star (3/1/18) (2/28/18) Newsline Philippines (3/2/18)**

Singapore

In late FEB, the Singaporean Ministry of Home Affairs proposed a new law to prevent people at terror attack sites from taking photographs, recording videos, or communicating about police operations; a measure security experts say would be the first of its kind worldwide. The measure would stop counterterrorism tactics and capabilities from becoming widely known and limit the footage available for propaganda use by terrorist groups and their followers. The law could cover situations that "seriously threaten public safety," and examples provided by the Ministry cover a broad range from Mumbai-style attacks that involve multiple shooters in an urban environment, to bombs detonating in public areas, to large-scale civil disobedience that disrupts the flow of traffic. The new measures would also cover journalists and breaches could lead to a maximum fine of \$20,000 and prison terms of up to two years. **CS Monitor (2/27/18) Today Online (2/27/18)**

Thailand

In an effort to establish peace, authorities from the 4th Army Region have introduced a project known as "Bring People Home." This could be an appealing option for the approximately 2,000 former insurgents with previous ties to the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) who have left Thailand to escape charges associated with attacks in the Deep South. A former PULO member disclosed that insurgents are seeking refuge in other regions such as Malaysia, Scandinavia, and the Middle East. At least 800 of the 2,000 are in Malaysia alone. The project encourages insurgents to lay down their weapons and to turn themselves in. Insurgents requested that upon surrender, that they not be detained or charged and that their Thai citizenship to be re-established. To date, 161 insurgents have joined the project since the beginning of the year. **Bangkok Post (2/2/2018)**

After a recent meeting in Malaysia, Thai government officials and insurgent groups have agreed to choose a district to establish a ceasefire in southern Thailand. The plan has been presented to Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha for his approval. The list of potential districts to be the designated safety zone has not yet been released. The establishment of the safety zone is expected to take at least six months and the progress to be assessed. MARA Pattani and the Thai government mentioned they will continue to work together to pick one district out of a list of five districts. This announcement marks a significant step towards peace within the region, however, some critics of the ongoing peace talks expressed concern of the seriousness of working with MARA Pattani and if they accurately represent the insurgents instilling unrest in the Deep South. **Benar News (2/15/2018)**

Philippines: February IED Events



There were six IED detonation events, three IED found and cleared events, and nine IED cache events.


On 4 FEB, the New People's Army (NPA) conducted a public execution of two militiamen. To deter first responders, the NPA detonated an IED in Palma Gil, Talaingod, Davao de Norte, Davao. The NPA have repeatedly issued warnings to the paramilitary father and son duo to desist from engaging in criminal activities and in counterrevolutionary operations. They said he was a CAFGU (Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit) member and rabid recruiter of the notorious Alamara paramilitary forces under the payroll of the 10th Infantry Division-AFP. **InterAksyon (2/13/18)**

On 15 FEB, an IED cache was recovered during a police raid from a residence in Jose Ancheta, Maddela, Quirino, Cagayan Valley. During the raid, the police also arrested an NPA member, which they believe disrupted a series of planned roadside bombings. The cache contained the following: mobile phones, ten "anti-tank" IEDs, 14 pieces of "anti-personnel" IEDs complete with blasting devices and cords, and copies of "Ang Bayan," a publication of the Communist Party of the Philippines. **Inquirer Northern Luzon (2/16/18)**


On 17 FEB, an IED detonated by Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) against a military vehicle in Meta, Datu Unsay, Maguindanao wounding five soldiers. The BIFF claimed responsibility for the attack and stated it was in retaliation for the series of offensives the Army launched against the group. **Inquirer Mindanao (2/18/18)**

On 20 FEB, the AFP found and cleared an IED in Sumisip, Basilan. Army troops recovered the estimated 4.5kg device after suspected Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) members failed to detonate the device. **Sun Star (2/20/18)**

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year IED Event Casualty Count




The upsurge in IED activity this month is primarily attributed to the increase in the number of New People's Army's (NPA) attacks and the discovery of several of the group's caches by the security forces. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have stated that they will not return to peace negotiations while the rebels continue their offensive activities.

With foreign Islamic State fighters arriving in the country and delays to the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) still pending, ISIS-Philippines will continue its effort to rebuild its organization through recruitment; however, the arrest of these individuals will hinder ISIS-PHL recruitment efforts.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Thailand: February IED Events



There were eight IED detonation events, two IED found and cleared events, and one IED cache event.

On 1 FEB, an IED hidden under a roadside structure detonated as a teacher escort passed Highway 4084 in Tambon Praiwan, Tak Bai, Narathiwat. The incident did not result in casualties. Insurgents hiding nearby detonated the 1kg device to target the police patrol, which resulted in a crater three inches deep and 12 inches wide. **Phuket Gazette (2/1/18)**

On 11 FEB, three pipe bombs were rendered safe after being found on Tha Sadet Road, Taluban, Sai Buri, Pattani early in the morning. At 0825, two IEDs detonated near Yaring School injuring two individuals. About an hour later in Tambon Khao Tum, Pattani, two other IEDs detonated; one was placed in the basket of a bicycle parked along Highway 410. The second explosion was 100 meters away; no casualties resulted from these explosions. **Bangkok Post (2/11/18)**


On 12 FEB, an employee in Pak Kret, Nonthaburi, discovered a cache in a rental apartment in Muang Thong Thani condominiums. Kritchapol Poolsil, a former soldier from Yala, was detained. The suspect told officials that he works for Wuthipong "Kotee" Kochathamakun, who is the leader of the Red Shirt movement, formally known as the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD). The cache contained, four homemade ping-pong bombs, two pipe bombs, 20 firecrackers and a M26 grenade. **Bangkok Post (2/13/18)**

On 15 FEB, a roadside RCIED detonated while a team of six defense volunteers on a teacher escort detail was traveling to Pracha Uthit School; six injuries resulted to include three paramilitary members and three students. The device weighed approximately 3-5 kg and was packed with chopped steel rods. **Bangkok Post (2/15/2018)**
Nation (2/15/2018)


On 18 FEB, a 25kg CWIED buried under the road in Ban Tue Ko, Chanae, Narathiwat detonated as soldiers from the 5th Engineering Battalion were bringing supplies to Ban Sakai where an engineering unit was repairing the road; four soldiers were injured. The explosion also caused the pick-up truck to flip over. The device was a gas cylinder with a wire leading 150 meters into the vegetation. **Bangkok Post (2/18/2018)**

Thailand's IED activity doubled in February compared to previous months. The use of small, low-weight IEDs has emerged as a pattern this month as these devices are easy to conceal and given an opportune moment, can be emplaced quickly. This month also experienced the continuation of coordinated attacks to include the four explosions across Pattani on 11 FEB and the IED related arson attacks in Narathiwat on 24 FEB. The increased activity is likely attributed to the Chinese New Year celebrations, as well as a negative response to the shifted attention on the political unrest in Bangkok with the recent Pro-Democracy demonstrations taking place.

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Burma: February IED Events



There was six IED detonation events and one IED found and cleared event.


On 7 FEB, an IED detonated in Kalewa Town, Sagaing Region when a child connected a detonator to a 1.5 volt battery, resulting in three children injured. **Global New Light of Myanmar (2/9/2018)**

On 13 FEB, a 13-year-old girl and an 18-month-old boy were injured by an IED explosion in Ottara Thiri Township when a 10-year-old boy attempted to dispose of the device in a fire. **Global New Light of Myanmar (2/15/18)**

On 20 FEB, an IED detonated at a bank in Lashio City resulting in the deaths of two women and injuries sustained by 22 personnel. **Daily Sabah (2/21/18)**


On 24 FEB, an IED detonated at the residence of Tin Maung Swe, a senior government official in the local administration. There were no reported casualties. **Reuters (2/24/18)**

On 24 FEB, three IEDs detonated and three IEDs were found and cleared in a coordinated attack on government targets in Sittwe, Rakhine state; one police officer wounded. The IED detonations occurred at the residential compound of Rakhine's State Secretary and in a downtown area in the vicinity of Rakhine State's High Court and Land Records Department Office. Based on photos provided in the media, one of the detonated devices appeared to be a possible moped VBIED. Three other IEDs were recovered from the area. **South Asian Monitor (2/27/18) Eleven Myanmar (3/4/18) Star Herald (2/24/18)**



IED activity increased in February with a series of detonations occurring at the end of the month that targeted commercial and government infrastructure. While no group or individuals claimed responsibility yet, local authorities distributed leaflets that warned about possible attacks from Kachin Independent Army or the Ta'ang National Liberation Army. Investigations into these events are ongoing and the Burmese government has not identified the primary perpetrators. IED activity is expected to remain elevated in Sittwe (the capital of Rakine State) as ARSA has attempted to increase its operations.

Malaysia: February IED Events



There were two IED cache events.

On 3 FEB, police recovered an IED cache following a raid on a suspected drug trafficker's residence in Ketereh, Kelantan. A married couple and another man were arrested in connection with the raid. The cache contained three pistols, IED components (an electronic circuit board, batteries, sulphur, and firecrackers), and methamphetamine valued at USD 39. **Benar News (2/5/18) Sun Daily (2/5/18)**

On 3 FEB, police recovered an IED cache following a raid on a suspected drug trafficker's residence in Ketereh, Kelantan. A couple and another woman were arrested in connection with the raid. The cache contained one pistol, 164 rounds of ammunition, IED components, and methamphetamine valued at USD 26. **Benar News (2/5/18) Sun Daily (2/5/18)**

IED activity in Malaysia remains consistently low. The IED caches reflect the IED environment in Malaysia, where most IED events are associated with criminal activity. Police believe the suspects possessed the firearms and explosive materials to protect themselves from authorities.

It is important to note that police identified that the firearms recovered from the aforementioned suspects originated in southern Thailand and were smuggled into Malaysia (at an average cost of USD 1400 per pistol). Firearms smuggling into Malaysia from Thailand is not uncommon. Firearms are heavily regulated in Malaysia, where it is difficult for civilians to legally acquire them. However, an active Southern Thai Insurgency across from the porous Malaysia-Thai border facilitates a readily available source of weaponry. Indeed, most illegal firearms on Peninsular Malaysia are traced back to Thailand, where they can be acquired for as cheap as USD 80 and smuggled in for USD 3.

Northeast Asia: February Significant Activity

Japan

On 15 FEB, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano signed an agreement to work together to keep the Tokyo 2020 Olympics and Paralympics safe from the threat of terrorism involving nuclear materials. The agreement includes measures to support IAEA experts' participation in events relating to the Tokyo games, the exchange of information on nuclear security issues, and the loaning of radiation detection equipment to Japan. Kono and Amano also discussed working together more closely on the issue of North Korea in hopes of resuming IAEA inspections of the North's nuclear program. If the IAEA were able to re-enter North Korea, Japan discussed assisting with the initial costs of securing the necessary equipment and personnel. **Nikkei (2/16/18)**

IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

Late January to early February (WW): Attacks have coincided with the anniversary of worldwide protests to Danish Cartoons in 2006

28 FEB (THA): First time Thai Gov. and insurgents sign a peace agreement

12 MAR (IND): Anniversary of 1993 Mumbai attack

13 MAR (THA): Anniversary of founding of Barisan Revolusi Nasional

15-16 MAR (IND): United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) Army Raising Day

7 APR (IND): ULFA Raising Day

13-15 APR (THA): Thai New Year (Songkran)

28 APR (THA): Anniversary of 2004 Krue Se Mosque Incident

IND – India
THA – Thailand
WW – Worldwide

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
February 2018	28 WW	29 WW	30 WW	31 WW	1 WW	2 WW	3 WW
	4 WW	5	6	7	8	9	10
	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
	25	26	27	28 THA	1	2	3
March 2018	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	11	12 IND	13 THA	14	15 IND	16 IND	17
	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
April 2018	1	2	3	4	5	6	7 IND
	8	9	10	11	12	13 THA	14 THA
	15 THA	16	17	18	19	20	21
	22	23	24	25	26	27	28 THA
	29	30	1	2	3	4	5

Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate
 ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil
 ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
 CIV – Civilian
 CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
 COIN – Counter-insurgency
 CWIED – Command Wire IED
 DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency
 EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile
 EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal
 F/C – Found & Cleared
 HME – Homemade Explosives
 HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)
 IDF – Indirect Fire
 IDP – Internally Displaced Persons
 IED – Improvised Explosive Device
 KFR – Kidnap for Ransom
 KIA – Killed in Action
 LOC – Line of Communication
 LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas
 MSR – Main Supply Routes
 NFI – No Further Information
 NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report
 PBA – Post Blast Analysis
 PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED

PCB – Printed Circuit Board
 PN – Partner Nation
 PPIED – Pressure Plate IED
 QRF – Quick Response Force
 RCIED – Radio Controlled IED
 RCP – Route Clearance Patrols
 RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
 SA – South Asia
 SAF – Small Arms Fire
 SEA – Southeast Asia
 SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
 TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide
 TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C₇H₅N₃O₆)
 TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
 UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
 VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED
 VEO – Violent Extremist Organization
 VOIED – Victim Operated IED
 WIA – Wounded in Action

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group
 BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
 BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani
 BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate
 BSF – Border Security Forces
 BNP – Bangladesh National Party
 BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)
 CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)
 CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
 CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines
 CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)
 GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani
 HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
 HNLC – Hynniewtre National Liberation Council (India)
 HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh
 IB – India's Intelligence Bureau
 IM – Indian Mujahideen
 IrW – Irregular Warfare
 ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
 ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham
 JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid
 JI – Jemaah Islamiya
 JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
 JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh
 JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed

JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
 JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh
 KIA – Kachin Independence Army
 KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao
 KIO – Kachin Independence Organization
 LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba
 MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
 MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group
 MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
 NPA – New People's Army
 PNP – Philippine National Police
 POLRI – Indonesian National Police
 PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization
 RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
 RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil
 SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
 SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
 ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam
 UWSA – United Wa State Army
 YCL – Youth Communist League